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2015 SYMPOSIUM:                                          
KEYNOTE ADDRESS 
Reconceptualizing the Future of 
Environmental Law: The Role of Private 
Climate Governance 
MICHAEL P. VANDENBERGH* 
 
The title of this Symposium, Re-conceptualizing the Future of 
Environmental Law, accurately captures the challenge facing 
environmental law scholars and policymakers in 2015. The 
success of environmental law in the future will not arise from 
doubling down on the approaches developed over the last 50 
years. Instead, it will arise from our willingness to learn from the 
past without being bound by the conceptual frameworks that 
dominated the early development of the field. 
In particular, a successful future for environmental law is 
more likely to emerge if we acknowledge that the environmental 
problems, policy plasticity, and regulatory institutions that 
shaped the early decades of the field are no longer dominant, and 
if we develop new responses that reflect the shifts that have 
occurred on each of these points. I begin by identifying several 
important shifts in environmental problems, policy plasticity, and 
institutions. I then explore how new conceptual frameworks—
sometimes explicit and sometimes not—are already leading to 
 
* David Daniels Allen Distinguished Chair of Law, Director, Climate 
Change Research Network, and Co-Director, Energy, Environment and Land 
Use Program, Vanderbilt University Law School. My thanks go to Jason 
Czarnezki and the students of the Pace Environmental Law Review for 
organizing the 2015 Pace Environmental Law Review Symposium, Re-
conceptualizing the Future of Environmental Law.  The faculty and student 
participants provided very helpful comments on this project, and the student 
editors did an excellent job editing the keynote address into this article. 
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new responses to some of the most challenging environmental 
issues. 
No environmental issue is more challenging than climate 
change, and physicist Jonathan Gilligan and I have argued for a 
conceptual shift that involves recognizing the opportunity to buy 
time with private governance.1  We have not argued that private 
governance is a complete response or that it is the only new 
approach to climate change, but we have asserted that private 
initiatives can achieve a private governance wedge––emissions 
reductions that grow each year and average a billion tons per 
year over the 2016-2025 period.2 By drawing on existing 
efficiency incentives and motivations to reduce corporate and 
household carbon emissions, private initiatives can buy time 
while national and international governmental processes are in 
gridlock. In addition, many of these initiatives can complement a 
carbon price after it is adopted. The challenge is to make the 
conceptual shift: to move beyond the early history of 
 
 1. See generally Michael P. Vandenbergh & Jonathan M. Gilligan, Beyond 
Gridlock: The Private Governance Response to Climate Change, 40 COLUM. J. 
ENVTL. L. (forthcoming 2015), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2533643 
[hereinafter Vandenbergh & Gilligan, Beyond Gridlock]. For a short summary of 
the ideas presented at this keynote address, see TEDx, Can Your Company Stop 
Global Warming? Michael P. Vandenbergh at TEDxNashville (May 11, 2014), 
YOUTUBE, http://youtu.be/2bXNcEQ6QX0, archived at https://perma.cc/99CN-
KJ9Y. 
 2. Other promising new approaches that do not assume a comprehensive 
international or national carbon price include polycentric governance. See 
generally Robert O. Keohane & David G. Victor, The Regime Complex for 
Climate Change, 9 PERSP. ON POL. 7, 7 (2011) (advocating for a climate change 
regime complex); John R. Nolon, In Praise of Parochialism: The Advent of Local 
Environmental Law, 26 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 363 (2002) (land use law at the 
local level); Elinor Ostrom, Nested Externalities and Polycentric Institutions: 
Must We Wait for Global Solutions to Climate Change Before Taking Actions at 
Other Scales?, 49 ECON. THEORY 353 (2012); Matt Potoski & Aseem Prakash, 
Green Clubs: Collective Action and Voluntary Environmental Programs, 16 ANN. 
REV. OF POL. SCI. 399 (2013) (conceptualize voluntary environmental programs 
as clubs); Benjamin K. Sovacool, An International Comparison of Four 
Polycentric Approaches to Climate and Energy Governance, 39 ENERGY POL’Y 
3832 (2011); Richard B. Stewart et al., Building a More Effective Global Climate 
Regime Through a Bottom-Up Approach, 14 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 273, 274 
(2013) (identifying bottom-up mitigation strategies). For a view on private 
climate governance from a political science perspective, see JESSICA GREEN, 
RETHINKING PRIVATE AUTHORITY: AGENTS AND ENTREPRENEURS IN GLOBAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE (2013). 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol32/iss2/2
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environmental law and recognize that environmental governance 
is not synonymous with public governance. 
I. LEARNING AND UNLEARNING THE LESSONS 
OF HISTORY 
History can be a guide to the future, but it also can create 
blinders that hinder our ability to recognize and develop effective 
responses to new problems. The idea that generals fight the last 
war is mentioned so often that it has become trite, but it is 
uncomfortably true regarding environmental law and policy. 
Three often unstated assumptions fit into that category. The first 
is that the environmental problems of today are not exceptional—
that they differ, if at all, only in degree from the problems of the 
past. The second is that the policy plasticity of the past—the 
ability to adopt comprehensive legislation at the national level 
and international agreements at the global level—exists today 
much as it did in the heyday of environmental lawmaking from 
1970 to 1990.3  The third is that the most important regulatory 
institutions––including the regulatory actors, actions and 
targets––of the 1970-1990 period remain the same today. All 
three of these assumptions no longer hold true, and the sooner we 
abandon them, the sooner we will be able to generate the 
creativity and momentum necessary to fashion a future for 
environmental law that we can all be proud of decades from now. 
A. Environmental Problems 
As to the problems of today, climate change is simply 
different from earlier threats. Whether it is “the mother of all 
collective action problems”4 or just the most challenging collective 
action problem, no environmental threat addressed by the 
statutory framework erected in 1970-1990 matches climate 
change in the magnitude and irreversibility of the potential 
 
 3. The onset of gridlock at the international level arguably began in 2000 
rather than 1990. JONATHAN M. HARRIS & BRIAN ROACH, THE ECONOMICS OF 
GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE 35 (2007). 
 4. Sarah Krakoff, Fragmentation, Morality, and the Law of Global Warming 
28 (Colorado Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 07-
10, 2007); see also Richard J. Lazarus, Super Wicked Problems and Climate 
Change: Restraining the Present to Liberate the Future, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 
1153, 1155–56 (2009). 
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harm, the cost of the response, the global scale, the deep 
integration of environmental harms and economic activity, and 
the justice concerns between developed and developing countries 
and between current and future generations. 
The last point about future generations is particularly easy to 
overlook in debates about the appropriate responses to climate 
change. Policy debates tend to focus on the next several months 
or years, and justice advocates often focus on the burdens of 
climate mitigation and the wealth disparity among populations 
living in developed and developing countries today, rather than 
the tens or hundreds of future generations that will live in a 
disrupted world.5  Psychologists tell us that near-term, vivid, 
local events are most likely to affect beliefs, norms and behavior, 
but the most certain and most severe climate events are far 
easier to project over a long-term and global scale.6  Economists’ 
arguments regarding the use of discount rates reinforce this 
temporal lens.  The value of the climate change harms that will 
be avoided in future centuries is miniscule in the calculus after 
the application of almost any non-zero discount rate.7 
Not surprisingly, policy debates and scientific reports follow 
this pattern as well. The debate over the Waxman-Markey cap 
and trade bill in 2008-2009 often focused more on the several 
hundred dollar annual increase in the average household 
 
 5. See generally Michael Vandenbergh & Jonathan M. Gilligan, Macro 
Risks: The Challenge for Rational Risk Regulation, 22 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 
401 (2011) [hereinafter Vandenbergh & Gilligan, Macro Risks]. 
 6. See Michael P. Vandenbergh & Kaitlin Raimi Toner, Climate Change: 
Leveraging Legacy, 41 ECOL. L.Q. 139 (2015) [hereinafter Vandenbergh & 
Raimi, Leveraging Legacy]. 
 7. See Paul R. Portney & John P. Weyant, Introduction, in DISCOUNTING AND 
INTERGENERATIONAL EQUITY 15 (Paul R. Portney & John P. Weyant eds., 1999) 
(“Assume . . . that the gross domestic product of the world will be $8 quadrillion 
in the year 2200 in current dollars.  Suppose that we want to calculate the 
present value of that sum using the 7% discount rate that the Office of 
Management and Budget recommends for such purposes.  The answer we get is 
a surprising $10 billion.  In other words, it would not make sense for the world’s 
present inhabitants to expend more than $10 billion today (or about $2 per 
person) on a measure that would prevent the loss of the entire GDP of the world 
200 years from now.”).  For a recent assessment of the costs of climate change if 
climate disruption affects the economic growth assumptions included in 
economic models, see Frances C. Moore & Delevane B. Diaz, Temperature 
Impacts on Economic Growth Warrant Stringent Mitigation Policy, 5 NATURE 
CLIMATE CHANGE 127, 127-28 (2015).  See also HARRIS & ROACH, supra note 3, at 
35. 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol32/iss2/2
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electricity bill than the multigenerational benefits of reducing 
carbon emissions. Similarly, scientific reports about projected sea 
level rise often end in 2100, and the public debate commonly 
focuses on whether the common estimate of a two-foot sea level 
rise in 2100 is too high or low.8  Yet even if carbon emissions peak 
today and decline substantially over the following decades, sea 
levels will still be increasing 1,000 years from now.9  Although 
the precise future sea levels are not clear, the likely increase is 
far above two feet and could easily be tens of feet, with more to 
come. In short, we are acting as if the deep future holds 
essentially no value to us today. No other environmental issue, 
with the possible exception of nuclear waste disposal, raises a 
similar concern. 
B. Policy Plasticity 
As Michael Gerrard has demonstrated in a clever 
photograph, federal environmental regulations have grown to the 
point where the stack of environmental volumes of the Code of 
Federal Regulations dwarfs the stack of Internal Revenue Service 
tax regulations.10  A natural conclusion from viewing these stacks 
is that government responses to environmental problems are 
robust. EPA’s recent climate regulations provide some support for 
that view, but by now many of us have noted that no major 
federal pollution control statute has been enacted in the United 
States (U.S.) in the last quarter century.11  The statutory 
 
 8. See Vandenbergh & Gilligan, Macro Risks, supra note 5, at 425.  See 
generally Ann Powers, Sea Level Rise and Its Impact on Vulnerable States: Four 
Examples, 73 LA. L. REV. 151 (2012) (discussing the effects of sea level rise). 
 9. See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE (IPCC), CLIMATE 
CHANGE 2001: SYNTHESIS REPORT 89 (Robert T. Watson et al. eds., 2001), 
available at http://www.grida.no/publications/other/ipcc_tar/, archived at 
http://perma.cc/96BH-RLFF. 
 10. Michael Gerrard, Photograph, 2014 (copy on file with the author). 
 11. See, e.g., Todd Aagard, Environmental Law Outside the Canon, 89 IND. 
L.J. 1239,1239-41 (2014) (noting absence of major statutes and arguing for 
embedded and disbursed public environmental governance); Richard Lazarus, 
Congressional Descent: The Demise of Deliberative Democracy in Environmental 
Law, 94 GEO. L.J. 619, 619, 629 (2006) (describing congressional action in mid-
2000s as “effectively moribund”); David Uhlmann, The Quest for a Sustainable 
Future, 1 MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 1, 9 (2012) (noting absence of statutes); 
Michael P. Vandenbergh, The Emergence of Private Environmental Governance, 
44 ENVTL. L. REP. 10125, 10132 (2014) (providing chart of major pollution 
5
2_VANDENBERGH FINAL 9/30/2015  1:12 PM 
2015] PRIVATE CLIMATE GOVERNANCE 387 
authority behind Gerrard’s regulatory pile is critical for effective 
climate mitigation, but the legislative process has been in virtual 
gridlock since the fall of 1990. 
We can debate the causes, and the gridlock could break at 
any moment, but the legislative inaction in the U.S. is at least a 
cautionary note about the likelihood of major new legislation in 
the near term.12  For some environmental problems, legislative 
inaction at the federal level is a rational response: The statutes 
are up to the task, and the environmental issues are largely in 
hand. Yet few believe that the statutory framework erected 
during the 1970-1990 period provides the optimal national 
response across the board. Efforts to achieve many objectives––
whether to scale back the federal role, to make existing 
instruments more efficient, to address new problems, or to 
increase the use of emissions trading and other innovative new 
instruments––have all failed since the Clean Air Act 
Amendments of 1990. 
Although these objectives are important, the best argument 
for legislative action is that the federal statutory framework is 
woefully inadequate to address climate change. EPA’s use of 
existing authorities to reduce emissions from motor vehicle 
emissions, new major stationary sources, and existing electric 
generating units, when combined with state and local actions, the 
growth of natural gas supplies, and other factors, should make it 
possible for the U.S. to achieve the 17% emissions reduction 
target announced in connection with the Copenhagen 
negotiations in 2009.13  But it is important to recognize just how 
modest that target is: achieving the 17% reduction from 2005 
levels by 2020 will leave U.S. annual emissions in 2020 higher by 
almost 4%, or roughly 200 million metric tons per year, than if 
 
control statutes 1970-2013); Michael P. Vandenbergh, Private Environmental 
Governance, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 129, 129 (2013) (noting a two decade absence of 
major pollution control statutes) [hereinafter Vandenbergh, Private 
Environmental Governance]. 
 12. See Vandenbergh, Private Environmental Governance, supra note 11, at 
131-32. 
 13. Darren Samuelsohn and Lisa Friedman, Obama Announces 2020 
Emissions Target, Dec. 9 Copenhagen Visit, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25, 2009, 
http://www.nytimes.com/cwire/2009/11/25/25climatewire-obama-announces-2020 
-emissions-target-dec-9-22088.html?pagewanted=all, archived at http://perma.cc 
/ZV62-WQ77. 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol32/iss2/2
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the U.S. had achieved its Kyoto target of 7% emissions reductions 
from 1990 levels during the 2008-2012 Kyoto compliance period.14 
In addition, the prospects for adopting and implementing a 
carbon price at the national and international levels over the next 
decade are dim.15  In the U.S., a carbon tax or cap and trade 
system is possible in the near term, but unlikely. The legislation 
would have to draw on widespread, but weak, support from the 
U.S. population to overcome concentrated opposition from the 
fossil fuel industry and from advocates of smaller government.16  
The House of Representatives is unlikely to support a meaningful 
carbon price with its current membership, and the current 
configuration of congressional districts makes near-term change 
unlikely.17  In the Senate, sixty votes would be required, even in 
the absence of a Presidential veto.18  An international agreement 
with credible commitments for emissions reductions has been 
difficult to achieve, and even if the negotiations succeed, 
 
 14. These figures are based on the following assumptions and calculations: 
1990 levels were 6,233.23 million metric tons, so a 7% reduction from 1990 
levels is 5,796.9039 million metric tons.  In 2005 levels were 7,253.78 million 
metric tons, so a 17% reduction from 2005 levels is 6,020.6374 million tons. The 
difference is 6,020.6374 - 5,796.9039 = 223.7335.  The percentage change is 
223.7335 / 5,796.9039 = 3.859534397%. This assumes that emissions would have 
remained constant after the Kyoto reductions. Data for calculations, see 
Greenhouse Gas Inventory Data Explorer, EPA (July 21, 2014), 
http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/ghgemissions/inventoryexplorer/index.html#a
llsectors/allgas/econsect/all, archived at http://perma.cc/PVB5-AXWD. 
 15. For a discussion, see Vandenbergh & Gilligan, Beyond Gridlock, supra 
note 1, at 19. 
 16. See, e.g., Public’s Policy Priorities For 2015, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (Jan. 
15, 2015), http://www.people-press.org/2015/01/15/publics-policy-priorities-
reflect-changing-conditions-at-home-and-abroad/1-15-2015-priorities_01/, 
archived at http://perma.cc/A2CV-LRP2 (reporting that “global warming” ranks 
22nd of 23 issues). 
 17. See Joe Williams & Anthony Salvanto, Control of the House and 
Redistricting’s Effect, CBS NEWS (Nov. 4, 2012, 11:15 AM), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/control-of-the-house-and-redistrictings-effect/, 
archived at http://perma.cc/T2AZ-V5G7. 
 18. One way to bypass this barrier is to adopt climate legislation as an 
appropriations measure. That is difficult to do, but the process used for the 
Affordable Care Act suggests that it is not impossible. See generally, Fillibuster 
and Cloture, U.S. SENATE, https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/ 
common/briefing/Filibuster_Cloture.htm (last visited Apr. 5, 2015), archived at 
https://perma.cc/6JDG-4CDM. 
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ratification of a treaty in the U.S. will require sixty-seven votes in 
the Senate.19   
A more likely approach is a continuation of recent piecemeal 
efforts that seek to reduce U.S. emissions and induce movement 
by other countries without requiring congressional action.20  
These may be the most viable efforts, but they are unlikely to 
yield adequate levels of emissions reductions in the near term. 
Meanwhile, every decade of delay locks in almost one degree 
Fahrenheit of increased global average temperature and a forty 
percent increase in costs.21 
I certainly do not have a crystal ball, and legislators could 
respond to shifts in public opinion in the event of major heat 
waves, droughts, or other natural events. Movement by other 
countries also could occur and could change the political 
landscape in the U.S. Yet even as climate scientists have become 
more certain about the role of humans in causing climate change, 
a large segment of the American population has become less 
certain.22  In addition, even after a major climate bill is adopted, 
several years will be necessary to fully implement a national 
carbon price.23  An international carbon price will take even 
 
 19. U.S. CONST. art II, § 2. 
 20. See, e.g., Elinor Ostrom, A Long Polycentric Journey, 13 ANN. REV. OF 
POL. SCI. 1, 5-6 (2010) (examining polycentric responses to climate change); 
DAVID G. VICTOR, GLOBAL WARMING GRIDLOCK: CREATING MORE EFFECTIVE 
STRATEGIES FOR PROTECTING THE PLANET 264 (2011) (discussing strategy 
involving clubs of countries); Richard B. Stewart et al., Building a More Effective 
Global Climate Regime Through a Bottom-Up Approach, 14 THEORETICAL 
INQUIRIES L. 273, 274 (2013) (evaluating bottom-up initiatives); see generally, 
Kenneth W. Abbott, Strengthening the Transnational Regime Complex for 
Climate Change, 88 TRANSNAT’L ENVTL. L. 543 (2012) (examining global private 
governance initiatives); Daniel C. Esty, Bottom-up Climate Fix, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 21, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/22/opinion/bottom-up-climate-
fix.html?ref=opinion, archived at http://perma.cc/8B98-2NMU (evaluating 
bottom-up initiatives); Sarah Light, The New Insider Trading: Markets within 
the Firm, 34 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. (2015) (examining carbon markets within firms); 
Eric Orts, Climate Contracts, 29 VA. ENVTL. L. J. 197, 232 (2010) (proposing 
contracting arrangements). 
 21. For a discussion and citations, see Vandenbergh & Gilligan, Beyond 
Gridlock, supra note 1, at 7. 
 22. See Michael P. Vandenbergh et al., Energy and Climate Change: A 
Climate Prediction Market, 61 UCLA L. REV. 1962, 1964 (2014) [hereinafter 
Vandenbergh et al., A Climate Prediction Market]. 
 23. American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009 (ACES), H.R. 2454, 
111th Cong. (2009) (bill was defeated in the Senate). 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol32/iss2/2
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longer. After a carbon price begins to bite, the legislation not only 
will have to survive repeal efforts (something the recent 
Australian carbon tax could not do), but also increase over time. 
All of these favorable outcomes are possible, but it is risky to be 
overly optimistic about the policy plasticity of an adequate carbon 
price or any other comprehensive legislative response. 
C. Regulatory Institutions 
In addition to shifts in environmental problems and policy 
plasticity, the available regulatory institutions have changed 
since the 1970-1990 period. This includes not only the regulatory 
actors, but also the regulatory actions and targets. The shift has 
occurred in ways that affect the most promising strategies for 
climate mitigation and the future of environmental law more 
generally. 
1. Actors 
When confronted by a major social problem, many policy 
analysts ask: “What can government do?”24  Our vocabulary 
reinforces this framing. Terms ranging from “policymaker” and 
“regulation” to “international” all signal that government is the 
actor seeking to shift behavior. But why not ask: “What can any 
organization do?” When we re-frame the question this way, it is 
easy see a broader range of actors that can and do address 
environmental problems. For example, private corporations, 
advocacy groups, and other non-profit groups are performing 
standard-setting and enforcement functions across a wide range 
of environmental problems.25 
Private governance is not new. If private governance occurs 
when private organizations play the traditional governmental 
roles of reducing negative externalities, managing common pool 
resources, and promoting the production of public goods, then 
various forms of private governance have been in place for 
 
 24. See, e.g., Michael Levi, The Hidden Risks of Energy Innovation, ISSUES IN 
SCI. & TECH. (2013), available at http://issues.org/29-2/michael-2/, archived at 
http://perma.cc/GH3U-ELUQ (stating that “[d]omestic policy design faces one 
central question: Where should government intervene?”). 
 25. For an overview, see Vandenbergh, Private Environmental Governance, 
supra note 11, at 141-47. 
9
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decades or centuries.26  Private standards have regulated 
everything from food production in ancient times, to medieval 
labor practices, to late nineteenth century fire safety.27  But a 
remarkable expansion has occurred over the last several decades 
in the role that private organizations play in environmental 
protection.28  The private organizations playing this role include 
not only corporations and advocacy groups, but also private 
standards and certification organizations, private universities, 
religious organizations, labor groups, and other private non-profit 
groups. Although the effects of these private environmental 
governance activities are not well understood, in many cases the 
groups appear be filling important gaps in public environmental 
governance.29 
2. Actions 
In turn, viewing a new set of actors as playing an 
environmental governance role can open up new possibilities for 
the types of actions that can be taken. Whether the framework is 
 
 26. Common law torts could be considered a form of public or private law, but 
I place torts outside the private environmental governance category given the 
strong public role in adjudicating and enforcing tort judgments. See Sarah E. 
Light & Michael P. Vandenbergh, Private Environmental Governance, in 
ENVIRONMENTAL DECISION MAKING, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
(Robert Glicksman & LeRoy Paddock eds., forthcoming 2015). 
 27. See TIMOTHY LYTTON, KOSHER: PRIVATE REGULATION IN THE AGE OF 
INDUSTRIAL FOOD 70-103 (2012) (food); RACHEL P. MAINES, ASBESTOS AND FIRE: 
TECHNOLOGICAL TRADEOFFS AND THE BODY AT RISK (2005) (fire safety); Kenneth 
W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, The Governance Triangle: Regulatory Standards 
Institutions and the Shadow of the State, in THE POLITICS OF GLOBAL 
REGULATION 44, 46 (Walter Mattli & Ngaire Woods eds., 2009) (climate change 
mitigation at global level); Tim Bartley, Certifying Forests and Factories: States, 
Social Movements, and the Rise of Private Regulation in the Apparel and Forest 
Products Fields, 31 POL. & SOC’Y 433, 433–34 (2003) (forests); Marc Allen Eisner, 
Private Environmental Governance in Hard Times: Markets for Virtue and the 
Dynamics of Regulatory Change, 12 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN L. 489, 489 (2011) 
(climate change mitigation); Errol E. Meidinger, Environmental Certification 
Programs and U.S. Environmental Law: Closer Than You Think, 31 ENVTL. L. 
REP. 10162, 10162 (2001) (forests); David Vogel, The Private Regulation of Global 
Corporate Conduct, 49 BUS. & SOC’Y 68, 68 (2010) (business ethics). 
 28. See Vandenbergh, Private Environmental Governance, supra note 11, at 
129. 
 29. See STEERING COMM. OF STATE-OF-KNOWLEDGE ASSESSMENT OF STANDARDS 
& CERTIFICATION, TOWARD SUSTAINABILITY: THE ROLES AND LIMITATIONS OF 
CERTIFICATION 9 (2012) (citing studies). 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol32/iss2/2
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Kip Viscusi’s four institutional mechanisms,30 Jim Salzman’s five 
regulatory categories,31 or other ways to describe the tools 
available to address environmental problems, private governance 
in many cases offers private parallels to the instruments typically 
used by government (e.g., command and control regulation, 
market mechanisms, and informational regulation)32 and to the 
subject matter areas of environmental law (e.g., air, toxics, and 
fisheries).33  The new instruments include private standards and 
certification systems, private supply chain requirements, 
corporate employee efficiency programs, non-governmental 
organization (NGO) social norm initiatives, and many others. 
For example, when NGOs pressure banks to disclose and 
reduce the environmental effects of their borrowers’ projects, the 
result is not federal regulation or an international agreement, but 
a set of private standards called the Equator Principles.34  The 
vast majority of global project finance lending is now conducted 
by banks that have agreed to comply with the Equator Principles. 
These private standards were produced through a process that 
closely resembles Administrative Procedure Act notice-and-
comment rulemaking, and the standards require borrowers to 
conduct environmental studies that are similar to those required 
for major federal actions under the National Environmental 
Policy Act. 
Similarly, after failed efforts in the 1980s to generate an 
international agreement on forestry issues, NGOs and major 
forest products firms formed the Forest Stewardship Council 
 
 30. W. Kip Viscusi, Toward a Diminished Role for Tort Liability: Social 
Insurance, Government Regulation and Contemporary Risks to Health and 
Safety, 6 YALE J. ON REG. 65, 65 (1989) (identifying four institutional 
mechanisms: government regulation, market forces, liability, and social 
insurance). 
 31. James Salzman, Teaching Policy Instrument Choice in Environmental 
Law: The Five P's, 23 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 363, 363, 374 n.29 (2013) 
(identifying five environmental regulation categories: prescription, property, 
penalties, payments and persuasion). 
 32. See Sarah E. Light & Eric W. Orts, Parallels in Public and Private 
Environmental Governance, 5 MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. (forthcoming 2015) 
(discussing public-private instrument parallels). 
 33. See Vandenbergh, Private Environmental Governance, supra note 11, at 
133-34 (discussing public-private subject matter parallels). 
 34. For a discussion and citations, see Vandenbergh, Private Environmental 
Governance, supra note 11, at 151. 
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(FSC), a private standard, certification, and labeling system.35 
Private certification systems such as FSC now apply to roughly 
fifteen percent of all temperate forests, and a smaller but still 
substantial share of other forests.36  Similarly, the Marine 
Stewardship Council (MSC), another private standards, 
certification, and labeling system now sets sustainability 
standards for fisheries that supply almost ten percent of global 
fish landings for human consumption.37  The figure is roughly 
fifty percent of all fish caught in the U.S. for human consumption, 
and a quick look at the fish sandwich available at the leading fast 
food restaurant in the U.S. will provide an example of the MSC 
label.38 
These examples of collectively set private standards do not 
require a major departure from typical conceptions of 
environmental governance, although government takes a back 
seat to private organizations in these private governance 
initiatives. Other forms of private environmental governance are 
more challenging. Examples include the inclusion of 
environmental requirements in supply chain contracting 
arrangements, corporate programs that target employees’ 
household energy use, and NGO programs that target household 
carbon emissions. Although these initiatives do not fit as neatly 
into traditional conceptions of governance, they play comparable 
roles to government regulations and programs by reducing 
negative externalities, managing common pool resources, and 
producing public goods. 
3. Sources 
The shift in the actors and actions that are considered part of 
environmental governance also can affect our conception of the 
sources of environmental harms and the targets of environmental 
governance. Most important, when private governance is a 
possibility, the behavior of sources that are largely beyond the 
reach of traditional government regulatory tools may become 
easier to influence. Two examples demonstrate this point.  
 
 35. Id. at 148. 
 36. Id. at 149. 
 37. Id. at 150. 
 38. Vandenbergh, Private Environmental Governance, supra note 11, at 150. 
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First, when the House Commerce Committee was preparing 
to draft the legislation that eventually become the Waxman-
Markey cap-and-trade bill, the staff produced a series of very 
thoughtful reports identifying the sources of carbon emissions 
and the range of potential legislative responses.39  The report on 
the sources of emissions took a conventional approach, drawing 
on the EPA annual greenhouse gas inventory to identify the 
leading sources in the U.S. Using this conceptual framework, 
electric generation and transportation appeared to contribute 
roughly a third of U.S. emissions, and traditional government 
regulation of power plants and motor vehicle manufacturers 
appeared to be the obvious response. In contrast, the “residential” 
share was only five percent, a number that suggests little need to 
allocate major regulatory resources in that direction.40 
Referring to this small share, the Committee staff noted that 
households and other small contributors were not promising 
targets of climate legislation. Yet the 5% figure excluded from the 
residential share all of the emissions associated with household 
electricity use and personal motor vehicle transportation, both 
activities that are under the substantial direct control of most 
households. When these emissions are included in the residential 
share, the total is roughly a third to 40% of U.S. emissions.41 
Viewed in this light, household and personal motor vehicle energy 
use merit more attention. 
In turn, new types of actions can be taken if the sources 
include households, not just electric power plants or auto 
manufacturers. Many low-cost, non-intrusive behavioral and 
other options that are not appropriate for large industrial sources 
 
 39. See Michael P. Vandenbergh et al., Implementing the Behavioral Wedge: 
Designing and Adopting Effective Carbon Emissions Reduction Programs, 40 
ENVTL. L. REP. 10547, figs.1 & 2 (2010) [hereinafter Vandenbergh et al., 
Implementing the Behavioral Wedge]. 
 40. Id. This approach still dominates EPA’s presentation of carbon emissions 
data. See EPA, INVENTORY OF GREENHOUSE GASES AND SINKS: 1990-2011 (2013), 
available at http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/Downloads/ghgemissions/US-
GHG-Inventory-2013-Main-Text.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/7ZPN-RJTB. 
 41. Vandenbergh et al., Implementing the Behavioral Wedge, supra note 39, 
at 10549 n.12.  Individuals or households are not the only sources that are often 
overlooked. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, Controlling Pollution by Individuals and 
Other Dispersed Sources, 35 ENVTL. L. REP. 10745 (2005) (noting the importance 
of small businesses). See also Sarah E. Light, The Military-Industrial Complex, 
55 B.C. L. REV. 879 (2014) (focusing on Military consumption of energy). 
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are effective for households.42 Not only is the range of actions 
broader if households are viewed as an important source, but it 
may be easier for a range of private organizations (e.g., NGOs, 
utilities, and corporations through customer and employee 
programs) to steer household behavior than it is for governments 
to do so.43 An example is the eco-driving program that has 
emerged through a cooperative effort between major 
environmental NGOs and automakers.44 
A second example demonstrates how re-conceptualizing the 
actors and actions of environmental governance can affect our 
view of the sources of an environmental problem. When we think 
of the sources of toxic chemicals, we often think of the industrial 
facilities that release toxics from the smokestack. Programs 
ranging from Section 112 of the Clean Air Act, to the hazardous 
waste management requirements of the Resource Conservation 
and Recovery Act, to the Toxic Release Inventory industrial 
facility reporting program are built on this model: They regulate 
or require reporting of toxic emissions from large facilities. 
Although large volumes of toxics also go out the door in the 
products made by these facilities, the government regulatory 
scheme for the most part does not extend to the consumption end 
of the toxics lifecycle. 
In recent years, private organizations have developed 
initiatives developed on the premise that the seller of goods, not 
just the manufacturer of the goods, is the source of the emissions. 
The result is a series of NGO reputation campaigns that target 
corporations, and commitments by Target, Wal-Mart, and other 
retailers to use supply chain contracting requirements to ban a 
long list of toxics from the products they buy. In a sense, this is 
the modern version of the pollution prevention concept that was 
popular in the late 1980s through mid-1990s. It was very difficult 
 
 42. See Jason J. Czarnezki, Everyday Environmentalism: Concerning 
Consumption, 41 ENVTL. L. REP. 10374, 10374 (2011); Thomas Dietz et al., 
Household Action Can Provide a Behavioral Wedge to Rapidly Reduce US 
Carbon Emissions, 106 PROCEEDINGS OF NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 18452, 18452 (2009). 
 43. A recent possible exception is the demand reduction building block of the 
Clean Power Plan. See Amanda Carrico et al., US Climate Policy Needs 
Behavioral Science, 5 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 177 (2015). 
 44. See Jack N. Barkenbus, Eco-driving: An Overlooked Climate Change 
Initiative, 38 ENERGY POL’Y 762, 765 (2010); Vandenbergh & Gilligan, Beyond 
Gridlock, supra note 1, at 55-56. 
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for government to pursue pollution prevention opportunities 
aggressively given its limited statutory authorities and concerns 
about intrusion into industrial and commercial processes, but 
private governance initiatives are doing so.45 As a leading 
chemical industry trade association executive recently observed 
in response to failed federal toxics efforts, “[t]he loss of public 
confidence [means] we’re going to increasingly have retailers that 
are regulators, like Wal-Mart and Target.”46 
4. Effects 
Are these private environmental governance initiatives 
effective? Some private initiatives may be closer to greenwashing 
than governance, but that is unlikely for many types of private 
environmental governance given the participants, incentives, and 
transparency.47  In addition, many forms of private 
environmental governance are widespread, suggesting that if 
they do affect behavior, they can have large environmental 
effects.48  More research is needed, but the important question to 
ask when assessing the efficacy of any governance initiative, 
whether public or private, is “as compared to what other viable 
option?” A complete solution is often not the goal of many private 
environmental initiatives, but if we ignore the limited policy 
plasticity of most comprehensive government responses, we may 
overlook private responses that can provide a partial answer and 
can be adopted and implemented given the existing policy 
plasticity.  
 
 45. See Pollution Prosecution Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-593, 104 stat. 2962 
(1990). For a discussion of concerns about government involvement in industrial 
processes as reflected in the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, see 
ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION LAW, SCIENCE, AND 
POLICY  (7th ed. 2013). 
 46. Upcoming Lautenberg Bill Could Be Key Test for TSCA Reform This 
Congress, INSIDE EPA WEEKLY REPORT, Apr. 1, 2011, at 1, 6. 
 47. See STEERING COMM. OF STATE-OF-KNOWLEDGE ASSESSMENT OF STANDARDS 
& CERTIFICATION, supra note 29. 
 48. I examined the top firms by sales in eight leading sectors and found that 
more than half of the firms (three quarters by sales, suggesting that larger firms 
do more of this than smaller firms) impose environmental requirements on their 
suppliers. See Michael P. Vandenbergh, The New Wal-Mart Effect: The Role of 
Private Contracting in Global Governance, 54 UCLA L. REV. 913, 916–17 (2007). 
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Will private governance initiatives make public governance 
less likely? Private governance initiatives could displace or 
compete with public governance, or they could play a gap-filling 
role, stepping in when government lacks the political capital, 
resources or expertise to act. They also could play a 
complementary or accelerating role.49  Far more research is 
needed on the extent to which private governance plays these 
roles and the conditions under which it does so. In the interim, it 
is important to avoid the temptation to assume either negative or 
positive spillover. 
II. THE PRIVATE CLIMATE GOVERNANCE 
WEDGE 
As I mentioned at the outset, climate change will drive the 
evolution of environmental law and policy, and government 
responses are in gridlock. Jonathan Gilligan and I have argued 
that private governance initiatives can complement public 
measures and generate a private climate governance wedge in the 
interim.50  Perhaps the greatest challenge to this argument is the 
view that only the coercive power and resources of government 
can achieve meaningful levels of emissions reductions. Engineers 
and others have used bottom-up studies to argue that a large 
efficiency gap exists, which, if closed, could yield several billion 
tons of emissions reductions worldwide.51 Economists often argue 
that there are no twenty-dollar bills sitting on sidewalks and 
have gone so far as to describe the efficiency gap as an “engineer’s 
fallacy.”52  The overall size of the efficiency gap is beyond the 
 
 49. The emergence of the FSC standard after the collapse of international 
forestry governance efforts is an example of the gap-filling role that private 
governance can play.  Private standards such as the chemical industry’s 
Responsible Care program may be both an effort to supplement government 
regulation and an effort to enhance a sector’s reputation to head off more 
intrusive government regulation (e.g., after the Bhopal disaster). Cary 
Coglianese & Jennifer Nash, Management -Based Strategies for Improving 
Private Sector Environmental Performance, FACULTY SCHOLARSHIP REPOSITORY 
(2005), available at http://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article 
=1104&context=faculty_scholarship, archived at http://perma.cc/9FCZ-K87L. 
 50. Vandenbergh & Gilligan, Beyond Gridlock, supra note 1, at 13. 
 51. For a discussion and citations, see Vandenbergh & Gilligan, Beyond 
Gridlock, supra note 1, at 64. 
 52. Id. For a recent discussion of the twenty-dollar bill argument, see David 
Bornstein, Investing in Energy Efficiency Pays Off, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 6, 2015, 
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scope of this essay, but below I explore the reasons why it is 
plausible to believe that the gap is large enough for private 
governance initiatives to achieve annual emissions reductions in 
the billion-ton range over the next decade. I begin by explaining 
what might motivate the actors who are essential to private 
climate governance, then turn to examples of existing initiatives 
and viable new initiatives. 
A. Motivations for Private Governance 
Why is it plausible to believe that private initiatives can 
achieve major emissions reductions in the absence of government 
coercive power or resources?  In general, private initiatives are 
possible because corporations and individuals typically seek to 
reduce costs, and carbon emissions often arise because of 
inefficiencies in the use of fossil fuels and other resources. Private 
initiatives also can harness existing support for climate 
mitigation, but our analysis does not live or die on the effects of 
normative influences on corporate or household behavior.53  
Opportunities to increase efficiency often are unexploited because 
of widespread market and behavioral failures. No academic 
discipline has a monopoly on the theory and methods necessary to 
evaluate the motivations for private governance, but work in 
economics, psychology, sociology, organizational behavior, 
political science, law, and other fields provides valuable 
insights.54 
An example of a market failure that affects household carbon 
emissions is the split incentive that arises when renters pay the 
electric bill, but landlords control the purchasing decisions 
regarding energy-using appliances.  This split incentive limits 
landlords’ incentives to purchase efficient appliances, even if the 
appliances would produce substantial net cost savings.  Similarly, 
 
3:30 PM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/02/06/investing-in-energy-
efficiency-pays-off/, archived at http://perma.cc/JT8G-VUC6. 
 53. For a discussion of the reasons why non-profit groups may be able to 
induce firms and households to act, see Vandenbergh & Gilligan, Beyond 
Gridlock, supra note 1, at 31-33. 
 54. The focus of this symposium “on the continued expansion of 
environmental law into distinct areas of the law, requiring an increasingly 
multidisciplinary approach beyond the confines of federal statutes,” accurately 
captures an important direction for the field. See generally Benjamin Sovacool, 
Energy Studies Need Social Science, 511 NATURE 529, 529-30 (2014). 
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an industry market failure occurs when under customary rate 
structures ship owners only pay thirty percent of the fuel costs of 
shipping goods, with the owner of the goods paying the other 
seventy percent, leaving the ship owner with limited incentives to 
invest in more fuel-efficient ships or operating procedures. 
In addition, a deep literature in psychology, sociology and 
behavioral economics has identified behavioral failures regarding 
energy, including steep discount rates and pervasive 
informational failures. For example, Shahzeen Attari and 
colleagues have documented a wide range of these failures, such 
as the fact that individuals underestimate by forty times the 
amount of energy used by their clothes dryers.55  Our research 
team has identified similar failures on issues ranging from motor 
vehicle idling to the value of hot water for cleaning hands.56  By 
overcoming these types of market and behavioral failures, private 
initiatives can accelerate efficiency gains, drawing on corporate 
and household self-interest to reduce emissions. 
Private initiatives also can draw on two forms of support for 
climate mitigation.  A small subset of the U.S. population views 
climate mitigation as a top priority, and strong preferences for 
climate mitigation can be expressed not only at the ballot box, but 
through philanthropic decisions, participation in advocacy 
groups, decisions in the workplace, and consumer purchasing 
decisions.  Climate mitigation is a low priority for a far larger 
group, however, and government laws and policies often do not 
reflect these types of preferences, particularly when concentrated 
interests oppose action.57 For the group that supports climate 
mitigation but assigns it a low priority, private governance 
 
 55. Shazeen Z. Attari et al., Public Perceptions of Energy Consumption and 
Savings, 107 PROCEEDINGS OF NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 16054, 16055-56 (2010). 
 56. See generally Amanda R. Carrico et al., Costly Myths: An Analysis of 
Idling Beliefs and Behavior in Personal Motor Vehicles, 37 ENERGY POL’Y 2881 
(2009) (demonstrating motor vehicle idling myths); Amanda R. Carrico et al., 
The Environmental Cost of Misinformation: Why the Recommendation to Use 
Warm Water for Handwashing is Problematic, 37 INT’L J. OF CONSUMER STUDIES 
433 (2013) (demonstrating hot water hand washing myths). 
 57. See, e.g., Roberto A. Ferdman, A New Pew Survey Shows Americans 
Might Finally Be Getting Serious About Global Warming, WONKBLOG (Jan. 15, 
2015), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2015/01/ 
15/new-pew-survey-shows-americans-might-finally-be-getting-serious-about-
global-warming/, archived at http://perma.cc/TRE6-HBY4 (noting that climate 
change ranked 22nd out of 23 issues in terms of policy priority for 2015). 
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provides opportunities to act in ways that require little 
investment of time or money, such as selecting a lower-carbon 
item when choosing between two comparably priced goods, 
making a small, cost-beneficial shift in household behavior, or 
opting to do business with a firm that has a positive reputation 
on climate issues. 
In addition, much of the conservative rejection of climate 
science is animated by solution aversion: the fear that 
acknowledging anthropogenic climate change will lead to a large, 
intrusive government response.58  Private climate initiatives offer 
a way to circumvent this problem. Those who place a high value 
on small government can acknowledge the existence of the 
problem because the solution is not government regulation, but 
the use of private organizations and markets to accelerate 
efficiency gains. 59 
B. Private Climate Governance Initiatives 
The remarkable growth of private climate governance in the 
last decade is another reason to believe that private initiatives 
can generate major reductions at low cost and without 
government action. I focus here on large corporations and 
households, but other organizations, including small businesses, 
religious organizations, civic organizations, and other non-profit 
organizations, also can be the source of emissions reductions. 
 
 58. For a discussion of the social science on climate beliefs and worldviews, 
see Vandenbergh et al., A Climate Prediction Market, supra note 22, at 1962.  
See also Troy Campbell et al., Solution Aversion: On the Relation Between 
Ideology and Motivated Disbelief, 107 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 809 
(2014) (discussing “solution aversion”).  For a recent blog discussion of the 
literature in this area, see Andrew Revkin, How ‘Solution Aversion’ and Global 
Warming Prescriptions Polarize the Climate Debate, DOTEARTH (Nov. 10, 2014, 
4:01 PM), http://dotearth.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/11/10/how-solution-aversion-
and-global-warming-prescriptions-polarize-the-climate-debate/?_r=0, archived at 
http://perma.cc/2NHT-3XAQ. 
 59. See Vandenbergh et al., A Climate Prediction Market, supra note 22, at 
1987-88. 
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1. Corporations 
Initiatives involving corporations can achieve roughly half of 
the private governance wedge.60  Corporations not only have 
incentives to achieve efficiencies, but they are motivated by 
reputational concerns, consumer purchasing concerns, investor 
and lender pressure, and employee morale concerns, among 
others. Of course, not all corporations are motivated to reduce 
emissions. Firms also may attempt to head off more stringent 
government requirements, may seek to raise rivals’ costs, or act 
in other ways that raise concerns.61   
Regardless of the source of motivation, however, the range of 
corporate private climate initiatives underway in the U.S. and 
around the world is remarkable. One effort, the Carbon War 
Room, is pursuing market failures in five corporate sectors with 
the goal of achieving total (not annual) emissions reductions of a 
billion tons from each sector.62  Other initiatives use corporate, 
project, investor, lender, and product disclosure to drive 
emissions reductions. For example, the CDP (formerly the Carbon 
Disclosure Project) uses the pressure of over $90 trillion in 
investor assets to induce firms to disclose their emissions. 
Although causation is hard to assess, recent reports suggest that 
firms that disclose emissions to CDP have reduced carbon dioxide 
emissions by hundreds of millions of tons. Similarly, major 
lenders to electric utilities in the U.S. have adopted the Carbon 
Principles, which require the disclosure of projected carbon 
emissions from proposed new power plants, as well as efforts to 
reduce emissions.63  In addition, although product carbon labeling 
is less common in the U.S. than in some other countries, our 
research suggests that a private product labeling initiative could 
have important effects on firms in some sectors.64 
 
 60. See Vandenbergh & Gilligan, Beyond Gridlock, supra note 1, at 51 
(discussion of the emissions reduction potential and specific corporate actions). 
 61. See, e.g., Carolyn Fischer & Thomas P. Lyon, Competing Environmental 
Labels, 23 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 692 (2014). 
 62. Vandenbergh & Gilligan, Beyond Gridlock, supra note 1, at 37-38. 
 63. Id. at 39. 
 64. See Michael P. Vandenbergh, Thomas Dietz, & Paul C. Stern, 
Commentary: Time to Try Carbon Labeling, 1 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 4, 4–6 
(2011). See also Jason Czarnezki, The Future of Food Eco-Labeling: Organic, 
Carbon Footprint, and Environmental Life-Cycle Analysis, 30 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 
3, 6 (2011). 
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Carbon disclosure can have particularly large effects if the 
incentives for emissions reductions are transferred through 
corporate supply chains. An example of this type of supply chain 
contracting activity is a 2010 announcement by Wal-Mart and the 
Environmental Defense Fund in which Wal-Mart committed to 
reduce its supply chain carbon emissions by 20 million metric 
tons, an amount equal to almost half of the emissions from the 
US iron and steel industry.65  Global supply chains can transfer 
pressure for low carbon goods and low carbon production across 
national boundaries, creating incentives to reduce carbon 
emissions by suppliers in developed and developing countries.66 
2. Households 
Private initiatives directed at households can achieve the 
other half of the private climate governance wedge.  A large share 
of these reductions can be achieved through “behavioral wedge” 
actions that address market failures and behavioral failures.67  
Behavioral wedge initiatives often use the types of non-intrusive, 
low cost measures that can be conducted by private advocacy 
groups, corporations, and other private organizations.68  Our 
research team estimated that the reasonably achievable 
emissions reductions from behavioral wedge actions can exceed 
roughly 400 million tons per year in the U.S. by 2020, and 
amount larger than all of the emissions of France.69 
In addition to the behavioral wedge actions, numerous other 
actions are targets of opportunity for private governance 
initiatives.70  For example, as mentioned above, individuals hold 
myths that, if corrected, could yield large emissions reductions 
without unrealistic assumptions about altruism or willingness to 
change behavior. Individuals not only underestimate their clothes 
dryers’ energy consumption by forty times,71 but also believe on 
 
 65. Vandenbergh & Gilligan, Beyond Gridlock, supra note 1, at 45. 
 66. See Michael P. Vandenbergh, Climate Change: The China Problem, 81 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 905, 934 (2008). 
 67. Vandenbergh & Gilligan, Beyond Gridlock, supra note 1, at 53. 
 68. Id. 
 69. See Dietz et al., supra note 42, at 18452. 
 70. See generally Vandenbergh & Gilligan, Beyond Gridlock, supra note 1 
(detailed discussion of these household actions). 
 71. Id. at 53, n.248. 
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average that they should idle their cars for over four minutes if 
they want to save gas and reduce vehicle wear and tear.72  The 
accurate period if the goal is to save money is between ten and 
thirty seconds, and this idling myth accounts for roughly 15 
million metric tons of emissions every year, an amount larger 
than the emissions from three of the largest U.S. industrial 
sectors.73  Similarly, most people also believe incorrectly that the 
use of hot water reduces germs when washing hands, and this 
hand washing myth accounts for roughly a million tons of 
emissions per year.74 
Major emissions reductions also can be achieved through 
other uses of information. For instance, the disclosure of energy 
efficiency information for existing homes is only beginning to be 
possible in multiple listing services. State legislatures are 
reluctant to act, but private initiatives that provide energy 
information in listings for new and existing homes could drive 
builders to build more efficient homes and encourage homeowners 
to invest in efficiency measures before putting homes on the 
market. Similarly, immediate energy feedback devices in homes 
are inexpensive and have yielded substantial emissions 
reductions, but under current government-set rate structures 
most electric utilities do not have incentives to reduce net 
demand for electricity. Not surprisingly, very few homes have 
these devices, but private initiatives could fill the gap. 
Another promising initiative involves both households and 
corporations. Many corporations, including Kimberly-Clark, Sony 
Pictures, and others, are beginning to offer programs to induce 
employees to reduce their energy use and carbon emissions not 
only at work, but at home as well.75  The corporate motivations 
for these programs are unclear at this point, but the programs are 
becoming more common. If successful, they offer another means 
of achieving emissions reductions from the household and 
corporate sectors on a large scale. 
 
 72. Id. at 56. 
 73. Id. at 57. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Vandenbergh & Gilligan, Beyond Gridlock, supra note 1, at 63. 
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3. Cross-Cutting Initiatives 
In addition to initiatives that target corporate and household 
behavior, cross-cutting private initiatives can address beliefs and 
motivations across many sectors. For example, much of the 
rejection of climate science arises from solution aversion and deep 
distrust of government.76  Not surprisingly, even as government 
climate science studies report increasing scientific certainty about 
anthropogenic climate change, conservatives are becoming less 
certain. Private governance offers a response that relies on 
private actors and actions, and may be more credible to 
conservative audiences. In short, private organizations may be 
able to establish a climate prediction market that would enable 
buyers and sellers to trade predictions about the global average 
temperature in 2020 or 2030, with the price of the prediction in 
the interim signaling the market’s assessment of the accuracy of 
the climate science. By enabling a private actor to assess and 
communicate the implications of the climate science, it may be 
possible to bypass barriers erected by the worldview of a large 
segment of the population. 
Similarly, as I mentioned at the outset, one of the greatest 
challenges to climate mitigation is the intergenerational collective 
action problem: The current generation must bear much of the 
cost of climate mitigation, but most of the benefits will accrue to 
future generations.77 Deep skepticism exists about the extent to 
which individuals care about their legacy, and this skepticism is 
reflected in political debates, which often struggle to focus beyond 
the next month or the next year, much less the next century or 
millennium. Our research suggests, however, that individuals do 
value their reputations after they die. When asked, individuals 
report on average that if they were allowed to spend $100 on 
enhancing their reputation, they would allocate almost $40 to 
 
 76. See Vandenbergh et al., A Climate Prediction Market, supra note 22, at 
1979.  The market we propose differs from other proposed climate markets in 
that it would be a private market, rather than one that would be established by 
government. See Shi-Ling Hsu, A Prediction Market for Climate Outcomes, 83 U. 
COLO. L. REV. 179, 212 (2011); Nate Silver, Best Idea of the Day: Climate Change 
Futures Markets, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT.COM (Nov. 23, 2009, 11:57 PM), 
http://fivethirtyeight.com/features/best-idea-of-day-climate-change-futures/, 
archived at http://perma.cc/US4X-FVAX. 
 77. See Vandenbergh & Raimi, Leveraging Legacy, supra note 6, at 139-45 
(discussing intergenerational issues). 
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their reputation after they die, and $60 to their reputation while 
they are alive.78 
Although legacy appears to have some effect on politicians 
(e.g., President Obama’s 2013 Georgetown climate speech focused 
largely on legacy issues), governments are unlikely to harness the 
public’s legacy concerns in a systematic way. A private 
organization, however, could form a climate legacy registry, and 
the registry could enable the general public, politicians, and 
corporations to record the actions they are taking today, knowing 
that the information will be available to the public for many 
generations.79  A private climate legacy registry will not 
transform the climate policy landscape, but the registry is yet 
another example of how it may be possible to shift beliefs, 
motivations and behavior if we abandon the conceptual blinders 
created by a government-centric view of environmental 
governance. 
III. CONCLUSION 
Private governance is not a substitute for public governance, 
but it offers an approach that reflects the challenge posed by 
climate change, the limited policy plasticity faced by governments 
in the modern era, and the availability of new institutional tools. 
Private environmental governance also provides a window into 
the future of environmental law. Increasingly, environmental 
lawyers will be called on to look beyond the traditional tools and 
targets of environmental law to find solutions to environmental 
problems. To do so, they will need to have open minds and to 
draw on experts from many fields. The legislative panaceas of the 
past may be right around the corner, but it is a risky strategy to 
assume that other options should not be pursued in the interim. 
It is also a mistake to assume that pursuing other approaches 
will reduce the likelihood of more effective public governance. In 
fact, the spillover effects of private and public governance are not 
well known, and spillover effects are just one of many new areas 
of inquiry that emerge when we reject the notion that the 
conceptual frameworks of the past are the only, or even the best, 
ways to think about the future. 
 
 78. Id. at 19. 
 79. Id. at 1. 
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